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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

19 February 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-32: THE COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA AND ITS EFFECT ON SINO-SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FAR EAST (Draft No. 2, Approved by National Estimates Board)

THE PROBLEM

To assess the Communist military position in Korea and to estimate the effects it may have on Sino-Soviet courses of action in the Far East.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT IS THE PRESENT NORTH KOREAN-CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA?

- A. What is the strength of Chinese Communist and North Korean forces now in Korea?
- B. What have been their estimated losses to date in men and equipment?
- C. What is their present reserve strength in terms of

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1. Trained manpower in North Korea?
 2. Trained manpower in Manchuria and elsewhere in China?
 3. Arms, equipment, and logistic support?
- D. What are the chief limitations on the use of this reserve?
- E. What has been the nature and extent of Soviet support to
1. The North Koreans?
 2. The Chinese?
- F. What are present Communist capabilities for conducting military operations designed to drive the UN from Korea or for fighting a war of attrition?

II. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN AFFECTED COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST?

- A. Have Chinese and Korean losses to date been such that they may have
1. Forced a deferment of operations planned for the Korean campaign?
 2. Hampered Chinese operations against internal forces hostile to Peiping?

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3. Cancelled or deferred operations planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indochina, Burma, or Japan?
 4. Strained or disrupted the domestic economy of China?
 5. Constituted a significant drain on Soviet resources?
- B. Would continued large-scale operations in Korea be likely to
1. Hamper Chinese operations against hostile internal forces?
 2. Cancel or curtail operations possibly planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indochina, Burma, or Japan?
 3. Strain or disrupt the domestic economy of China?
 4. Cause a significant drain on Soviet resources?

III. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT OF THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN ON COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST?

- A. Does it seem probable that the Chinese Communists have now modified their announced intention to drive UN forces from Korea?

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- B. If they came to the realization that it was impossible for them to do so, would they
 - 1. Withdraw their "volunteers"?
 - 2. Prolong the Korean fighting indefinitely in an effort to weaken the US and divide the UN allies?
 - 3. Seek a negotiated settlement?
 - 4. Call on the USSR for additional aid?
- C. If it became evident that the Chinese Communist position in Korea would become untenable, would they
 - 1. Withdraw?
 - 2. Seek a negotiated settlement?
 - 3. Call on the USSR to intervene?
- D. Have there been any recent signs that the Chinese Communists may now be willing to negotiate?
- E. What appear to be present Soviet intentions with respect to Korea?
 - 1. Would the USSR be likely to participate covertly or intervene openly under the Sino-Soviet treaty if
 - a. A long stalemate appeared probable?
 - b. A Communist expulsion from Korea were likely?

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2. If the Chinese Communists decided that circumstances dictated a withdrawal from Korea, what would be the effect on Sino-Soviet relations?

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